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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee
V.

1977 CADILLAC 2 DOOR SEDAN
DEVILLE; EIGHT THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR DOLLARS
AND TEN CENTS UNITED STATES
CURRENCY,

Case No. 930732-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. This court has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Title 78, Part
2a, Section 3(2) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of right from a denial of the claimant's motion to set aside
judgement by default.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
This case presents three issues for review: First, did the trial court employ the
proper procedures in entering a forfeiture judgement?

Second, did the trial court

commit error in applying the wrong legal standard to the motion to set aside the
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judgement?

Third, did the trial court commit error in entering findings of fact in

support of the motion to withdraw judgement that were not supported by the record?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appeals from a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 ( Utah
App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(9)(f) through (h).
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or
petition for release, the court shall examine the record and
if no answer is on file, the court shall allow the complainant
or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support
of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the property
as the court determines. If the county attorney has not
filed an answer to a petition for release and the court
determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not
entitled to a recovery of the property, it shall enter an order
directing the county attorney to answer the petition within
ten days. If no answer is filed within that period, the court
shall order the release of the property to the petitioner
entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court shall set
the matter for hearing within 20 days. At this hearing all
interested parties may present evidence of their rights of
release of the property following the state's evidence for
forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance of
the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or
release of the property as it determines.
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of
any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this
act or the laws of this state.
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Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgement, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct
of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons
in an action has not been personally served upon the
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgement is void; (6)
the judgement has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgement upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgement should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgement. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or {4), not
more than 3 months after the judgement, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgement
or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power
of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgement, order or proceeding or to set aside
a judgement for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgement shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial
notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
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resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.
(c) When discretionary, a court may take judicial
notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the
necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the
matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be
taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding,
the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any
fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall
instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a forfeiture proceeding in the fourth judicial district court
in and for Millard County, Utah. A forfeiture complaint, notice of seizure and intent
to forfeit were filed in the fourth district court for Millard County on January 1 1 ,
1989. (R. 1-5) An answer was filed on behalf of appellant on January 27, 1989. (R.
12-13) Trial was originally scheduled for February 28, 1993. (R. 16)

The trial was

continued (R. 21) and ultimately rescheduled to January 30, 1991. (R. 34) Neither
appellant nor counsel appeared on that date. (R. 38) Findings of fact and conclusions
of law were originally entered on January 30, 1991. (R. 44-46) Amended findings
of fact and conclusions of law were entered on February 8, 1991. (R. 50-52)

A

judgement of forfeiture was entered against appellant on January 30, 1991. (R. 44-
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46) On July 22, 1992, appellant made a motion to set aside the default judgement.
(R. 53-54) That motion was denied after a hearing. (R. 91-92)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 29, 1988, an automobile in which appellant was riding was
stopped at a roadblock on Interstate 15 in Millard County, Utah. (R. 51) Appellant
was charged and convicted of the offense of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute.

That conviction was reversed on appeal because the

roadblock was found to violate the fourth amendment. State v. Small. 819 P.2d 129
(Utah App.) QSH. den. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Appellant had originally retained
Sumner J. Hatch to represent him in the criminal case. Mr. Hatch was replaced on
the appeal by appellant's present counsel.
Mr. Hatch was also retained by appellant to represent appellant's claim with
respect to the forfeiture complaint that was the basis of this case. Mr. Hatch filed an
answer to the complaint on January 27, 1989. (R. 12-13) The case was originally
scheduled for trial February 28, 1990. It was continued and ultimately tried January
30, 1991. (R. 34) Neither appellant nor Mr. Hatch appeared at the trial. (R. 38) In
August, 1990, Mr. Hatch began to suffer from short term memory loss. (R. 85) That
condition ultimately resulted in Mr. Hatch resigning from the practice of law. That
occurred in January, 1993. (R. 85) Appellant was not notified of the trial date or the
entry of the judgement in the instant case until June, 1992. (R. 70) That was done
because Stephen R. McCaughey reviewed Mr. Hatch's files due to Mr. Hatch's
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inability to practice law. (R. 63)

In doing so, Mr. McCaughey discovered that

judgement had been entered in the instant case. (R. 62-64)
The appellant was notified of the situation by Mr. McCaughey (R 62-64). A
motion to set aside the judgement was made. (R. 53-54)

After a hearing on the

motion, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 91-92). The
trial court found that the representations related to Mr. Hatch's condition were true.
However, the motion was denied because the court found that appellant was aware
of Mr. Hatch's deteriorated mental condition and he chose not to seek new counsel.
(R. 92)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court failed to follow the procedures required by statute in a forfeiture
case. The trial court improperly took judicial notice of the evidence introduced at the
related criminal trial. Since the judicial notice was taken improperly, no evidence was
introduced in support of the judgement of forfeiture as required by statute.
The trial court applied an improper standard in determining appellant's motion
to withdraw the judgement made pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7). If the appropriate
standard had been applied, the trial court would have withdrawn the judgement.
The trial court's finding that appellant was aware of Mr. Hatch's inability to
practice law was clearly erroneous. There was no evidence introduced at the hearing
on the motion to withdraw the judgement that would support such a finding.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE IMPROPER TAKING OF JUDICIAL NOTICE RENDERED
THE FORFEITURE JUDGEMENT INVALID AS IT WAS NOT
DONE PURSUANT TO THE PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY
STATUTE.
On the date set for the forfeiture trial neither of the claimants nor their counsel
appeared to represent their respective interests. (R. 50) The trial court took judicial
notice of the evidence that was introduced at the claimant's criminal trial. (R. 50)
Based on the judicial notice and the pleadings the court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law. No transcripts of the criminal trial were introduced into evidence
as part of the request to take judicial notice. A judgement was then entered for the
plaintiff. (R. 47) At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the default judgement,
counsel argued that the procedure employed failed to meet the requirements of the
forfeiture statue, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (1953 as amended). (Tr. 6)
The forfeiture statue has no provision for a default judgement. Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-13(9)(f) (1953 as amended) relates to the procedure to be taken when there
is no answer on file to the state's forfeiture complaint. The relevant portion of that
statue provides:
After 20 days following service of a complaint or
petition for release, the court shall examine the record and
if no answer is on file, the court shall allow the complainant
or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support
of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the property
as the court determines....
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(9)(g) describes the procedures to be employed when
there is an answer on file to a forfeiture complaint. That statute provides:
When an answer to a complaint or petition appears
of record at the end of 20 days, the court shall set the
matter for hearing within 20 days. At this hearing all
interested parties may present evidence of their rights of
release of the property following the state's evidence for
forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance of
the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or
release of the property as it determines.[emphasis added]
This statute clearly requires that the state put on evidence before a forfeiture
judgement may be entered.
The issue that this court needs to address is whether the taking of judicial
notice in the instant case was appropriate.

If it was not appropriate, then the

judgement of forfeiture was obtained improperly.

This would require that the

judgement be reversed. Judicial notice is described in Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (U.R.Ev.). That rule states,
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of
adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially notice fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice,
whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely
request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of
taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed.
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In the absence of prior notice, the request may be made
after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken in
any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the
courts hall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct
the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as
conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
This court has recognized that Rule 201 may be used to allow a trial court to
take judicial notice of evidence previously introduced in a court proceeding. Riche v.
Riche. 784 P.2d 265 (Utah App. 1989). However, this holding was subject to a
number of restrictions. First, the evidence must be entered in a prior proceeding in
the same case. Second, this court held that there was no error in refusing to take
judicial notice when the transcript of the prior hearing was not provided.
The taking of judicial notice in this case was improper.

The criminal and

forfeiture cases do not constitute the same case as discussed in Riche. Although the
cases may share the same factual basis, they are independent of each other. Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-13(h) (1953 as amended), states,
Proceedings of this section are independent of any other
proceeding, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the
laws of this state.
This case also fails to meet the second requirement of Riche. There was no transcript
of the hearing provided to be part Of the court record. A transcript is necessary to
meet the requirement of U.R.Ev. 201(b)(2) that the fact be capable of ready and
accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
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The judicial notice taken in this case failed to meet the requirements of U.R.Ev.
201.

Consequently, the evidence was inadmissible. The judgement was entered

without meeting the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9)(g) (1953 as
amended). Consequently, the judgement is not valid. It should be reversed and the
case remanded to the district court with an order that the court take evidence on the
forfeiture issue.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED
THE WRONG LEGAL
STANDARD IN ADDRESSING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW JUDGEMENT.
Appellant moved the trial court to set aside the judgement pursuant to U.R.C.P.
60(b)(7).

This motion was based on the ineffectiveness or incompetence of

claimant's trial counsel. The trial court ruled that it had broad discretion in ruling on
such issues. The court cited Birch v. Birch, supra, as authority for that proposition.
In so ruling, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. The Birch case addresses
the standard of review on appeal. The abuse of discretion test is different from that
used to evaluate issues raised pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7).

This court had

previously adopted a three part test for courts to employ to determine whether relief
is justified pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7): First, the basis for the motion must be
something other than those listed in U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) through (6).

Second, the

alleged basis for the motion justifies relief. Third, the motion must be made within a
reasonable time.
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If the trial court had applied this three part test, appellant's motion would have
been granted.

As for the first requirement, the provisions of U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1)

through (6) are inapplicable to a claim of counsel's ineffectiveness or incompetence.
That rule provides:
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgement, order or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any
cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgement is void; (6) the judgement has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgement upon which it
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgement should have
prospective application.
None of these relate to a situation where counsel's ineffectiveness or incompetence
prevents him from acting as counsel.
The second issue requires a determination of whether the alleged basis for the
motion justifies relief. Clearly, trial counsel failed to provide competent counsel as
required by Rule 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 1 A violation

1

Those rules provide:
Rule 1.1. Competence.
11

of these rules may not in and of itself merit the setting aside of a judgement.
However, in the case at bar, Mr. Hatch's mental and physical state, combined with
his failure to communicate with his client put appellant in a situation where he
effectively had no counsel. This is clearly distinguishable from the situation where
counsel makes a mistake or neglects an obligation.
The court in Estate of Gasbarini v. Medical Center of Beaver County. Inc., 487
Pa. 266, 409 A.2d 343 (1979), recognized this distinction. In that case, the court
considered a motion to set aside a judgement which was entered against the plaintiff
following the suspension of her counsel from practice. The plaintiff was not notified
by her counsel of his suspension. The motion to reopen the judgement was not filed
until approximately six months after judgement was entered in favor of the defendant.

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to
a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.
Rule 1.3. Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.
Rule 1.4. Communication.
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.
12

After considering the circumstances giving rise to the entry of judgement, the court
stated:
We believe, however, that much more than neglect by
[plaintiff's attorney] is involved; here, [the attorney] could
not have participated in the argument of preliminary
objections had he desired to do so, as an order of this court
prevented him form practicing law. Under all of these
facts, we can find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in
opening the judgement originally entered in appellee's
favor. 409 A.2d at 345.
In Crews v. Houston County Department of Pensions and Security. 358 So.2d
451 (Ala. 1978), the court held that the procedural due process guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment include the right to effective assistance of counsel. In Crews,
the court noted that effective assistance of counsel does not require that a lawyer be
infallible.

Rather, the test is whether an examination of the entire record

demonstrates that a fair trial was afforded.

In the instant case, the cognitive

disabilities suffered by Mr. Hatch resulted in the denial of the assistance of counsel.
Consequently, the basis for the motion to vacate the judgement did justify the relief
that was sought.
The final factor to consider in U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7) is the reasonableness of the
time in which the motion is made. The amended findings of fact and conclusion of
law were entered on February 8, 1991. Appellant learned that the judgement had
been entered against him in this case in June, 1992. (R 69-70) The motion to set
aside the default judgement was made on July 22, 1992. (R. 53-54) The time period
from February, 1991, to June, 1992, cannot be attributable to the appellant. Counsel
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had received the information regarding the trial and the judgement, but failed to
communicate it to appellant.
In a similar situation, the state supreme court allowed relief from a judgement
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60 (b)(7). In Stewart v. Sullivan. 29 Ut. 2d 156, 506 P.2d 74
(1973), the motion was made one year after the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint
and some nine months after plaintiff learned of the dismissal. Plaintiff's counsel had
been suspended from the practice of law two months after the dismissal. The court
held that U.R.C.P. 60 (b)(7) was sufficiently broad to set aside its prior order.
In this case, the motion was made within a matter of weeks from the date that
appellant learned of the dismissal. Based on the ineffective manner in which his
previous counsel had assisted him, the time period prior to the date of his learning of
the dismissal should not be attributable to appellant. Consequently, the third part of
the test to determine a motion pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7) has been met.
The failure to apply the proper legal standard to determine the appellant's
motion is clearly an abuse of discretion. That error was prejudicial. If the proper
standard had been applied, the judgement would have been vacated. The trial court's
order denying appellant's motion to set aside the judgement should be reversed and
the case remanded to the district court with an order that the motion be reconsidered
and the proper legal standard applied.
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POINT III
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS AWARE OF MR.
HATCH'S
MENTAL
DISABILITY WAS
CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
In ruling on appellant's motion to set aside the judgement, the court did not
enter specific findings of fact. However, a written ruling was made. (R. 91-92) In
that ruling the court indicated that the evidence relating to Mr. Hatch's condition was
truthful. (R. 92) However, the court also indicated "....Mr. Small was aware of his
attorney's condition and simply chose not to find other counsel to protect his interest
in the forfeited property." (R. 92) There was nothing in the record from which the
district court judge could draw this conclusion.
In reviewing a trial court's finding of facts, the appellate court must apply a
clearly erroneous standard. U.R.C.P. 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is
against the great weight of the evidence. State v. Burke, 839 P.2d 850 (Utah App.
1992). When a finding of fact is contested, the party doing so must marshal all of
the evidence that was introduced to show that the finding cannot be supported.
Cornish Town v. Koller. 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988).
The evidence introduced at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the
judgement consisted of for affidavits. The affidavit of Stephen R. McCaughey (R. 6264) indicated that Mr. Hatch's health and mental condition had begun to degenerate
in the summer of 1990. At that time Mr. McCaughey began to assume responsibility
for some of Mr. Hatch's clients. However, Mr. McCaughey was not made aware of
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this forfeiture case and its status until June of 1992. At that time he notified the
client and took measures to have the judgement vacated.
The appellant, Lemuel Small, submitted an affidavit. (R. 69-70) He indicated
that he retained Mr. Hatch to represent him in the criminal and the forfeiture cases in
the Fourth District Court.
interests.

In doing so, he relied upon Mr. Hatch to represent his

Appellant indicated that he was not given notice of the trial or the

judgement in the forfeiture case until June, 1992. He further indicated that he was
not aware of Mr. Hatch's physical or mental problems until June, 1992.
Sumner Hatch's affidavit described his mental problems relative to memory
loss. (R. 85-86) He indicated that in October, 1990, he effectively quit practicing
law. He stated that with respect to this case, he did not take any action on the
notices that were sent nor did he contact his client. D. Gilbert Athay submitted an
affidavit corroborating the information relative to Mr. Hatch's mental condition. (R. 8890) He had known Mr. Hatch for 25 years and officed next door to him for 12 years.
Mr. Athay described the symptoms relative to the obvious problem with Mr. Hatch's
memory loss.
There is nothing in these affidavits giving rise to the inference that appellant
was aware of Mr. Hatch's condition, but allowed him to continue as counsel of record
in spite of that problem.

Appellant did change counsel for his criminal appeal.

However, there is nothing in that fact to indicate that appellant was aware of Mr.
Hatch's mental problems. The finding that appellant was aware of Mr. Hatch's
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condition is against the great weight of the evidence and is clearly erroneous. The
trial court's order should be reversed and the judgement should be ordered vacated.
CONCLUSION
Appellant seeks to have the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw the
judgement reversed. Appellant further seeks to have the case remanded to the district
court with an order requiring that the judgement be set aside and a new trial ordered.
DATED this

day of January, 1994.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Appellant

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered
on this
day of January, 1994, to:
Dexter L. Anderson
Deputy Millard County Attorney
750 South Highway 99
Fillmore, UT 84631
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ADDENDUM

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MILLARD, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON CLAIMANT SMALL'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT
BY DEFAULT

V.

Case No. 8446

n - 1977 CADILLAC 2 DOOR
SEDAN DEVILLE VIN #
6D47S70195013
n - EIGHT THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR
DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS
($8,234.10)

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on claimant SmalTs Motion to Set Aside Judgment
by Default. The Court, having reviewed the filed, read the memoranda of counsel, and
being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following:
RULING
1.

Claimant Small's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is denied.
DISCUSSION

Mr, Small, one of the claimants in this case, requests this Court to set aside forfeiture
order in this case under Rule 60 (b)(5) and/or (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: "On motion and

legal representative from a final judgment for the following reasons: . . . (5) the judgment is
void; . . . (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
Mr. Small claims that the judgment is void because of a violation of the claimants due
process rights. A judgment will only be considered void if the court lacked jurisdiction
before entering judgment. Mr. Small has not alleged that the Court lacked jurisdiciton over
the res. As a result, the Coun will not set aside the judgment based on Rule 60 (b)(5).
Mr. Small also argues that the forfeiture order should be set aside because of his
attorney's incapacitation and subsequent ineffectiveness. The trial coun has broad discretion
in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Subdivision (b), and its determination
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). Although the Coun has no reason to believe that the representations concerning
Mr. Hatch's condition are untrue, the Coun also believes that Mr. Small was aware of his
attorney's condition and simply chose not to find other counsel to protect his interest in the
forfeited propeny. Accordingly, the Coun declines to exercise its discretion and set aside
the judgment.
Dated at Provo, Utah, this

day of

. 1993

BY THE COURT

cc:

Stephen R. McCauehev F«i

FILED
COUNTY CLERK & EX-OFFIfO CLERK
OF THE DISTRICT COURT

AUG - 6 1992
MILLARD COUNTY
.CLERK
.DEPUTY]

^k ~

Stephen R. McCaughey - #2149
G. Fred Metos - #2250
MCCAUGHEY & METOS
Attorneys for Claimant Lemuel T. Small
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-6474
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY

Plaintiff,
vs.

1977 2 DOOR SEDAN,
VIN #6D47S70195013 and Eight
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Four
Dollars Ten Cents ($8,234.10),

Case No. 8446
Judge

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss.
)

Stephen R. McCaughey, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says;
1.

He is an attorney

licensed to practice

law in the State of

Utah who maintains an office in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Your affiant has personal knowledge of the facts set forth

below.
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3.

At all times pertinent to Claimant's Motion to Set Aside

Judgment by Default, he maintained his office at 72 East 400 South,
Suite 330, Salt Lake City, Utah.
4.

Sumner J. Hatch also maintained an office at that same

address on an "office sharing11 basis.
5.

Beginning apparently two years ago, your affiant became

aware that Sumner J. Hatch experienced both short and long term
memory loss.
6.

At about that same time, your affiant, during conver-

sations with Mr. Hatch, became aware that Mr. Hatch's reasoning
ability and logic were severally impaired.
7.

During that same time, Mr. Hatch requested that your

affiant assume the representation of some of Hatch's clients in
various matters.

However, Mr. Hatch did not request that your

affiant assume the representation of Lemuel T. Small in the above
entitled action.
8.

Sumner J. Hatch effectively discontinued the practice of

law approximately 18 months ago.
9.

While reviewing Mr. Small's file in June of 1992, your

affiant discovered the Notice of Setting, which served to schedule
this matter for trial on January 30, 1992.
11.

Your affiant then contacted the Clerk of the Fourth

Judicial District Court in and for Millard County to learn the
2

disposition at the time of trial.

Your affiant was informed that

Judgment had been entered in favor of Plaintiff.
12.

Thereafter, your affiant notified Lemuel T. Small that

the matter had been set for trial, that the trial date had passed,
that Mr. Hatch did not appear at trial and that Judgment had
entered in favor of Plaintiff.
13.

Coincidentally, your affiant had been retained by Lemuel

T. Small to represent his interests in the matter of State
vs.

Small,

of Utah

then pending before the Utah Court of Appeals.

Oral

argument was heard in that matter on February 28, 1992.

r

DATED this ^

day of August, 1992.

S t ^ t f e n R. McCau^hey

1992.

S u b s c r i b ^ _ « i d _ _ s w Q r n ^ t o - b e f o r e me t h i s August day o f
's&r^
LAREE J PEARSON *
Notary Public
STATE OF UTAH

My Commissi

<L.

*

^VfiOBWi. B P - » * r : 24.1993]
>a«msLC.uTwni

NotaryJPUBI

3ZMAM?h~

Residing:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that on the ^f

day of August, 1992, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Stephen R. McCaughey
was mailed, in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to:
Dexter L. Anderson
Millard County Chief Deputy Attorney
760 South Highway 99
Star Route, Box 52
Fillmore, Utah 84631

Qzs~4Ltoe^_y

4
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« w n r CLERK & Ex-omao CLERK
•"WSTRICTmngT

AUG 2 I 1992

MJUAIfo COUNTY
.CLERK

Stephen R. McCaughey - #2149
G. Fred Metos - #2250
MCCAUGHEY & METOS
Attorneys for Claimant Lemuel T. Small
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-6474

ncwiTV

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF
LEMUEL T. SMALL

Plaintiff,
vs.
1977 2 DOOR SEDAN,
VIN #6D47S70195013 and Eight
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Four
Dollars Ten Cents ($8,234.10),

Case No. 8446
Judge

Defendant.
STATE OF MONTANA

)

COUNTY OF

:ss.
)

Lemuel T. Small, being first duly sworn, deposes and says;
1.

He is a Claimant in the above entitled action.

2.

Your affiant resides in the State of Montana.

3.

He has personal knowledge of the facts set forth below.

4.

Shortly after September 29, 1988, he retained Sumner J.

Hatch to represent

his

interests

in connection with pending

criminal charges and in connection with the seizure and pending

06.

|

forfeiture of the sum of $8,234.10 and a certain 1977 Cadillac
automobile.
5.

Your affiant reasonably relied on Sumner J. Hatch to

represent his interests.
6. Your affiant did not have any notice, until apparently two
months ago that Sumner J. Hatch suffered from various physical
ailments which caused him to suffer short and long term memory
loss, a loss of reasoning ability and other cognitive deficits.
7.

Your affiant was not notified by Sumner J. Hatch, or by

any other person, prior to the time of trial that trial had been
scheduled for January 30, 1991.
8.

Your affiant did not learn that Judgment in favor of

Plaintiff had entered in this matter until apparently two months
ago.
9. Your affiant did not learn that Sumner J. Hatch had failed
to appear on his behalf and represent his interests until apparently two months ago.
10. Your affiant claims an interest in the sum of $8,234.10,
forfeited to the State of Utah by virtue of this Court's Default
Judgment.
DATED this / ^ day of August, 1992.

Lemuel T. Small
Affiant
2
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1 ~>~L
±h
Subscribed and sworn to before me this August day of /J>
,

1992.
My Commission Expires:
ttbtary Public
Residing:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that on the frD day of August, 1992, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Lemuel T. Small was
mailed, in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to:
Dexter L. Anderson
Millard County Chief Deputy Attorney
760 South Highway 99
Star Route, Box 52
Fillmore, Utah 84631
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Stephen R. McCaughey - 2149
G. Fred Metos - 2250
McCAUGHEY & METOS
Attorneys for Claimant Lemuel T. Small
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-6474

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
SUMNER J. HATCH

V.

1977 2 DOOR SEDAN,
VIN #6D47S70195013 and Eight
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Four
Dollars Ten Cents ($8,234.10)

Case No. 8446

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Sumner J . Hatch, being first duly sworn upon my oath do state the following to
be true and correct to the best of my knowledge:
1.

Beginning approximately August of 1990, I began suffering short term

memory loss, which has continued to increase in severity.
2.

Because of my loss of memory, I resigned from the practice of law in

January, 1993- However, I effectively quit practicing law in October of 1990.

08o

3.

I have no memory of ever receiving any notices involving the forfeiture in

this matter.
4.

Beginning approximately August of 1990, I received several notices of

pending actions in cases in which I was counsel. I took no action whatsoever because
of my loss of memory.
5.

I never contacted my client, Lemuel T. Small, regarding any notices sent out

by the court in this matter.
DATED this %

day of March, 1993.

'<**-,» ; ^ v

ATCH
SUMNER J. HAT
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this 2 ^ d a y of March, 1993
«1W» I . 4 M M |

Sfi!2 LuhO ClTy. I
i.,lH
IW Commission Expires
December 10.1996
State of Utah

44 &

ic
t Lake City, Utah

My Commission Expires:

\?\\b\q(*

2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered
on this / ? 4Hlav of March, 1993, to:
DEXTER L. ANDERSON
Millard County Deputy Attorney
750 South Highway 99
Star Route, Box 52
Fillmore, Utah 84631

-3OQ '

1

FILED
COUNTY CLERK & EX-OFFICIO CLERK
OF THE DISTRICT COURT

6

MPR

Stephen R. McCaughey - 2149
G. Fred Metos - 2250
McCAUGHEY & METOS
Attorneys for Claimant Lemuel T. Small
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-6474

MILLARD COuNT/
~f
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF
D. GILBERT ATHAY

Plaintiff,

1977 2 DOOR SEDAN,
VIN #6D47S70195013 and Eight
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Four
Dollars Ten Cents ($8,234.10)

Case No. 8446

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, D. Gilbert Athay, being first duly sworn upon my oath do state the following to
be true and correct to the best of my knowledge:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. I have known

Sumner J . Hatch for the past 25 years. I have had an office next to Sumner J. Hatch for
approximately 12 years.

08G
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2.

Beginning approximately August of 1990, it became obvious to me that

Sumner J. Hatch was having memory loss problems. Some examples are:
a.

I observed that he was unable to remember names of clients and
prosecutors.

b.

He would ask me the same questions everyday with no memory of
the answer I had previously given him.

c.

He would continually sit is his office for hours on end staring out the
window.

3.

In my opinion, Sumner J. Hatch was not competent to be practicing law and

representing clients for at least the last three years.
DATED this A i r d a y of March, 1993.

\s(AJlh«J:

D. GILBERT ATHAY
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this 7/\
Notary Pu!)lb
•
AMY K. CARLSON
I
72 East 4G0 South *320 f
Saft lake City, Utah e4111 !
My Commission Expires •
December 10,1995
h
StoteofUtah
J

day of March, 1993

L

NOTARY PUBVJC
Residing at $alt\Lake City, Utah

My Commission Expires:

08,"/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered
on this ^ ^ a y of March, 1993, to:
DEXTER L. ANDERSON
Millard County Deputy Attorney
750 South Highway 99
Star Route, Box 52
Fillmore, Utah 84631
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